Case 3:22-cv-00049-INKIWI-JOHUIDOOULIBEISESSEDI Filibet1048807/24 Page 1 of 43 Pageid#:

Baby L v. Esper, et al. - 3:20-CV-00009

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 2 CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION ***************** 3 "BABY L.", a minor, by and through her legal guardians and 4 next friends, DOE 1 and DOE 2, et al., 5 CIVIL NO.: 3:20-CV-00009 February 26, 2020 6 Plaintiffs, Lynchburg, Virginia SEALED TRO HEARING 7 (Conference Call) 8 VS. DR. MARK ESPER, in his official Before: 9 capacity as Secretary for the United States Department of HONORABLE NORMAN K. MOON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 Defense, et al., WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 11 12 Defendants. ***************** 13 APPEARANCES: 14 For the Plaintiffs: 15 RICHARD L. MAST, ESQUIRE Liberty Counsel 16 Certified to be a true and PO Box 11108 correct copy of the original. Lynchburg, Virginia 800-671-1776 Laura A. Austin, Clerk 24506 17 U. S. District Court Western District of Virginia court@lc.org 18 19 Date: Sep 16, 2022 20 21

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PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY; TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY COMPUTER.

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(Proceedings commenced 3:17 p.m.) 1 2 THE CLERK: Good afternoon. This is the case of Baby L, a minor, v. Dr. Mark Esper and others, Case Number 3 3:20-CV-00009. 4 Could you please state your name as who is on the 5 line. 6 7 MS. WYER: This is Kathryn Wyer with the Department of Justice. 8 MR. HAAS: This is Alexander Haas with the 9 Department of Justice. 10 MR. BUBAR: Dan Bubar with the United States 11 12 Attorney's Office, Western District of Virginia. MS. ROTTENBORN: Laura Rottenborn, United States 13 Attorney's Office. 14 THE REPORTER: Mary Butenschoen, the court 15 16 reporter. THE COURT: Mr. Mast is here in my office. This is 17 18 Judge Moon. 19 First of all, Mr. Mast, I have a couple of questions. Why is this getting to us this afternoon? It 20 21 looks from all of the papers, it looks like this situation was 22 known of a long time. (Interruption by court reporter.) 23 MR. MAST: This has been going on for a little while 24 We have been at work as much as we could within the 25

system to --1 2 THE COURT: No, but, I mean, the hearing to point why wasn't it brought to the Court sooner than an hour or two 3 4 ago, a couple hours? MR. MAST: Because the -- we've been engaging in all 5 efforts to work within the system, work within the DoD system 6 7 through our plaintiff, DOE 1's connections in DoD and the US Supreme Court. We brought it today because we received --8 we've never been able to talk with Department of Defense or 9 Department of State presuming that they were acting in good --10 well, that DoD at least was acting in good faith. DoD agency 11 12 initiated parole Visa request as early as February 11, so we were giving it time to play out. And we again found out that 13 Department of State or actors with the Department of State 14 were planning to release her at 1 a.m. Eastern tomorrow 15 morning to ICRC and there was no --16 THE COURT: And when did you learn that? 17 MR. MAST: I learned that early this morning. 18 THE COURT: Okay. What proceedings did you go 19 through with the government or with the Department of Defense? 20 MR. MAST: So the -- well, DOE 1 I presume -- how 21 22 would you like me to refer to the plaintiffs?

MR. MAST: DOE 1 was in _____. He sought permission from his chain of command to advocate on her behalf

THE COURT: That's fine.

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to seek a path to the United States for her to get medical 1 2 treatment. She has a skull fracture. She has secondary burns to the face. She has an extreme fracture of a hip and femur. 3 And as the orphan child of terrorists, he correctly 4 anticipated that there would be prejudice and bias against her 5 within the system in and the fact that the 6 7 cannot take children under the age of three. She was pushed. had asked the Customs to take her. They 8 declined and said we can't take care of a child that young. 9 So our Doe client sought permission from the 10 . He obtained that and he, in the path to treatment 11 12 in the United States, sought sole legal custody in . He was present in because of his residence in 13 at the time with the child. The J&DR court and 14 the circuit court in his county of residence assessed all the 15 factors in which the Court has, and the court record has been 16 supplemented since then, and --17 (Interruption by the court reporter.) 18 MR. MAST: So he sought custody of the child to act 19 in her best interest because there was no best interest of the 20 child, analysis that had been undertaken. And so he received 21 22 that order from the J&DR court in his county of residence, and he then sought to create the legal pathway that was necessary 23 to bring her here for treatment. 24

And he had also advocated up through different

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contacts to the Vice President's office. The vice president's office reached out -- and forgive me if I'm jumping around. Reached out and sought -- and said to , which is US Forces , and to , US Embassy And she was due to be in handed over initially when our client found out and he secured a directive from the Vice President's office saying make every effort to get her to the United States. THE COURT: So that's not a legal proceeding, though. The Vice President, how does he fit into chain of command? MR. MAST: Through the Vice President's office as part of the Executive Office of the President. THE COURT: But that's just using influence as opposed to --MR. MAST: That was influence at that point, correct, sir. THE COURT: Was there any legal proceeding he should have gone through? That's what I'm sort of getting at. Was there some sort of administrative proceeding that your client needed to go through with the Army? MR. MAST: He did, Your Honor. He sought -- so after getting clearance from his direct supervisor who is in the JAG shop in , in , he sought custody here They granted that. He sought a record of in

foreign birth. And then when he received these, whenever he received these, he notified DoD, notified and notified at the time. And so they have all had notice that this was a pathway to treatment in the US was being sought by our Doe client.

And so was on board after the Vice President's office had made every effort to intervene to get her here to the United States.

THE COURT: The Court -- I'm interested in whether it was an administrative process, not so much who knew -- who shot John, who knew whom. I want to be sure that he's done everything, if there would be any procedure that he should have gone through legally.

MR. MAST: He did, Your Honor. And so in seeking -so he would otherwise be a stranger to her except that he had
met with her, sought to establish a relationship, sought
approval of the direct _______, and everyone was on
board at that point of bringing her to the United States.

And so in order to act on her behalf legally he had to -- to have standing to do that. The courts found that standing under UCCJEA and that it was appropriate. I believe we have a copy of the order there.

THE COURT: Well, has he gone through the Secretary of Defense? I mean, whatever --

MR. MAST: The Department of Defense, Your Honor.

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Through that gears the defense, it's the -- the acronym is escaping me, but it's the system that -- that they put through that system. And so he provided notice to the chain of command; notice to the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense issued a , approved her for treatment under and based on that -- and approved. I mean, so everything was paid for, including tomorrow's appointment at for her. And he made repeated requests saying I've got her approved as , I need her to be moved, and those requests have been made to DoD, and has had knowledge of that. THE COURT: Was there any procedure he should have followed? When was he notified that his interest in the child was not being recognized? MR. MAST: So he was -- I'm sorry. So he foresaw -he saw the writing on the wall that was not going to take and invest in taboo child standard. He sought a legal pathway by getting custody. THE COURT: I understand that. But once he gets custody or he wants to get the child out of back , when did he know that he would be brought and by to whom? MR. MAST: It's uncertain as to when the specific time because we have had no communication regarding this. It's been through second channels. So it's a one-way line of

communications, And here's my , I want her to be moved, and we get no response. So this was in -- everything was on track for her to be moved at of 2019. And DoD had reached -- I'm sorry, had reached out to , who had requested a waiver of jurisdiction, and it was on his desk to be signed. A courtesy call was made to International Committee of the Red Cross by one of the staff captains there in . And he said this is a courtesy call, and then they immediately came out with, oh, we think we've found her relative.

So prior to November, so between October and

November the was in the lead. Their goal was to bring

her to the states as well. They were acting as if the rights

get secured under the court jurisdiction mattered,

and then they stopped. The process came to a halt, and she

was -- she was left in limbo. And so --

THE COURT: When was that?

MR. MAST: That would have been since the -- two days before ______, so that's November the 25-ish, around the November 25 timeline. So she was due to be flown out within 48 hours. That was put on hold. The president did not -- ______ did not say no, but he said we're going to defer decision until after the election results were satisfied. So we have this anonymous claimant.

Plaintiff Doe reached out to ICRC saying I want to

make this anonymous claimant aware that we've established a path to US citizenship -- or not citizenship, but the US treatment. And ICRC notified _____, and _____

and was very upset that our Doe client was advocating on her behalf and basically retook the reins from . It was prior to that point, so from the 6th of November custody to early December, everyone in was acting consistent with the child's best interest and consistent with our Doe client's wishes.

And when she did that, she had a conversation with General , and the result of that conversation was was back in the lead, whereas they said we won't oppose it, but let be the lead. And she convinced him to give an order, a gag order, to all personnel talking about Baby L's case and an order that no one can advocate on her behalf. And so from December to now we've been continuing to lobby through contacts. And we have persisted and requested that they respect the custody rights.

February 10 we found out that they were due to fly her out, and we had to send a demand letter at that point.

And so, again, they have never notified us or given us a chance to discuss her situation and protect our client's rights. Again, it's a surprise we're flying her out at 1 a.m., and that's coming through back channels.

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THE COURT: Well, you were told February the 10th 1 you knew they were going to one day fly her out, right? MR. MAST: We received word that DoD had placed a 3 hold on her transfer and I had spoken with lawyers from DoD. 4 I spoke with Ryan Newman, and we were still confident that --5 we felt fairly good that, in light of them placing a hold, in 6 7 light of DoD initiating a parole Visa, an agency initiated parole Visa, we still thought there was an opportunity to work 8 together. Because we're sensitive to the national security 9 interests that are here and we have no desire to -- you know, 10 we don't want to cause harm to those interests, but we think 11 12 those can still be secured. We just want a TRO on her being removed without their permission, and we think that there's a 13 pathway to resolve her case in the interest of justice in a 14 way that respects the best interest of the child. 15 THE COURT: Well, is there any legal decision you 16 17 have, case law, that would support the position that you will -- you have to establish that you're likely to prevail. 18 MR. MAST: Yes, sir. 19 20 THE COURT: TRO is not going to be the end of it, 21 so --22 MR. MAST: No, and we think can prevail. We've seen with Boumediene and with Hamdi that even these adult 23 terrorists have due process rights. In fact, committees 24

evaluate their case. And here we have an orphan infant girl

And we think there's a pathway to -- I think that we're likely to prevail on the merits at the end of the day. Can't take a minor child who a plaintiff has -- in this case our client has done everything right, and he's provided notice and he's acted with the knowledge and consent of the and he's gone through the DoD process to establish and he's continually notified -- I mean, there have been hundreds of emails. And the and have long known about this, and they have just simply refused, and they have treated these rights as a nullity and saying that these Court decisions don't matter.

So we're not saying that -- we're saying that she need to be vetted for DNA family ties. They need to be vetted for terrorist ties, because it is unconscionable to turn over a six-month old female to random claimants that the US government has not satisfied -- or have not even done the due diligence. There is hundreds of pages of classified documents that support this position. There's 150 pages of declassified documents that support this position. And we have -- they just can't simply wave a magic wand and say no due process for you because we don't like the fact that you've established legal custody.

And so we're prepared to address that in two weeks, but we need to preserve the status quo so that we can do that

so this little girl is not condemned to suffer --

THE COURT: Well, it seems, though, that the emergency here is caused by your delay. I mean, you could have -- you knew this day was coming.

MR. MAST: Respectfully, Your Honor, I would disagree. We have had -- we've just been given no information.

THE COURT: Well, that's enough. I mean, when you're told -- you were told that on the 10th, you got negative information then which would have indicated --

MR. MAST: We were still under the impression that DoD was working and that they had initiated a parole Visa request. Up until last night we were still -- we were still hopeful that DoD was on our side, but we came to the conclusion --

THE COURT: Well, just like in any other case, you can't hope you're going to settle the case and let the statute run. I mean, this is not a -- it's not that type of case, but, I mean, I have had people working on this all morning long. We had other stuff to do. You picked a crucial time in court. You filed hundreds of pages of documents and expect us to read them in an hour. I mean, that's not very respectful of the Court's time. I mean, you can't just walk in anywhere that I know of and demand that type of attention. I mean, there is responsibility, and it's not...

Who would like to respond right now? I would like to let Mr. Mast off the hook right now and see what objections there are to the TRO.

MS. WYER: Yes, Your Honor. This is Kathryn Wyer with the Department of Justice for the defendants.

The situation from our perspective is that the did get this custody order in the state court. But as plaintiffs' counsel just acknowledged, that was premised on the understanding that the government of would issue a waiver of its jurisdiction, and that has never happened.

This child is in -- has been under medical care in , because she was found on the there, but she is in ______, and it's really the government of ______ that has the authority over her.

And at this point it has requested that the United States return her to them because they have identified a relative that they want to reunite her with and that transfer -- you know, it's important for the United States to meet its international obligations, and so that is what the United States was planning to do here.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Mast says that what his client is interested in is being sure that this person who is seeking custody of the child is a proper person for the child to be returned to.

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MS. WYER: And that's really something that's within authority to determine. We can't under international law impose that -- we can't tell the government of the how to go about doing that, and it has gone through its process to determine that. The International Red Cross has been involved in this determination, and our understanding is that it has -- it made a final determination on that point and it made a request to us based on that to return the child to them. THE COURT: What did the International Red Cross do? MS. WYER: Well, their role, one of their major missions is to reunite families that are separated during wartime, so that has played a role as it normally does in assisting and identifying relatives. And, you know, it has been involved throughout the process. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else? Well, we -- I mean, I could mention that, MS. WYER: for example, there's no -- there's no proper habeas jurisdiction here because the child is in , and there's no habeas jurisdiction at Under DC circuit decision, the Court --THE COURT: Well, do you have any authority, I mean, like this where you have a state custody order? I would think

MS. WYER: It is unique because under -- usually

this would be rather unique situation.

these kinds of international custody or adoption issues are handled under the Uniform Custody Act that states have enacted which kind of take into account international law, and they are between foreign governments and private individuals in the United States. But here I guess the complicated factor is that DoD happened to be -- have custody of the child because it was providing medical treatment.

But at the same time, under that uniform law, the state court is not supposed to exercise jurisdiction over a child unless the foreign government has authorized it. And here that's what that jurisdictional waiver means. Since the government of ______ did not waive its jurisdiction, the state -- the ______ state court did not really have proper jurisdiction as the home state of a child to issue a custody order.

And in any event, because it doesn't have jurisdiction over the United States, our obligations, the United States' obligations towards can't really be impacted by what -- by that order. So I -- the DoD is in the position of having to fulfill its international obligations here, and so that -- it's really kind of -- it's trying to do that because it's very important that we meet our obligations. The State Department thinks that this is a proper course of action, and that's what the government here wants to do.

THE COURT: Have you examined the state court

proceedings? 1 Well, we are aware of the order. It's a 2 MS. WYER: sealed proceeding so we -- we don't have access to it. 3 THE COURT: But my question is: Did the judge take 4 had waived its rights in the situation? 5 up whether MS. WYER: Yes. I think what happened there is that 6 7 believed that the government of going to waive jurisdiction, and that's what they told the 8 Court, and the Court kind of prematurely issued an order based 9 on the understanding that was going to happen. And that's 10 what it says in the order, that it anticipates the government 11 12 is going to do that. As the plaintiffs' counsel just explained, they 13 thought that this was going to happen after the 14 , but then, ultimately, it never did happen. So that 15 order, that state court order, was issued based on a false 16 premise that has never happened. And now the government 17 has determined that it's not going to 18 has -- of waive jurisdiction because it has located that relative and 19 now it intends to reunite the family. 20 THE COURT: I'm looking at the order. 21 22 It says, "Evidence was provided that through the after consultation with the 23 has indicated 24 that it will issue a medical/responsibility/jurisdiction 25

waiver to consent to the US acting in the best interest of the 1 2 child as a refugee requesting asylum." That's the finding of the court in that case. 3 MS. WYER: Really, under international law, the home 4 state -- I mean, the court did not have jurisdiction 5 to issue any order unless it properly qualified as the home 6 7 state or an exception applied. And, I mean, it shouldn't really have acted prematurely based on that understanding 8 unless the waiver had actually been issued. It was still, we 9 think, improper for it to go ahead with that order. 10 MR. HAAS: And its findings said it will issue, not 11 12 that it had issued. THE COURT: Right. 13 All right. Mr. Mast, would you like to respond? 14 MR. MAST: Yes. Thank you, sir. 15 All of the available intelligence that we have 16 indicates that these are foreign fighters, not citizens of 17 , and their tactics -- their trainings, tactics, 18 and procedures indicated they move every 30 days. There are 19 several countries in the region. The evidence strongly 20 indicates that they are associated with the 21 22 and as foreigners to they are -this would be improper to -- the request to -- the request for 23 waiver of jurisdiction was primarily a face saving means of 24

to defer jurisdiction for political

allowing the

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expediency given the elections. And the intelligence supporting that waiver request, which made and which has opposed throughout this process, was very strong. I mean, we would not be saying if American jihadists were killed on a and an American baby was recovered, that because baby was found in that they had jurisdiction.

This was a face saving means to allow them to waive jurisdiction or to simply consent in the best interest of the child.

Under UCCJEA, if there's no country that has jurisdiction, and if you look at the record and the

Jurisdiction, and if you look at the record and the intelligence that we have, there is strong evidence that no country had jurisdiction over this because as illegal jihadists that have either come out of through through, none of them would have had citizenship and they would have had no citizenship to pass on.

Alternatively, if they retained citizenship then they would still be citizens of the country from which they came, in which case the child shouldn't have just been punted to the just because we found her in the rurals of , but because, you know, she was -- all of the intelligence indicates that they are a migratory jihadist group who are citizens of no country.

So the courts, courts, considered UCCJEA, and where the strong evidence was that there was no

country that actually had home jurisdiction, it had
jurisdiction to act, and it had -- you know, where there
are -- there's the savings clause under UCCJEA that addresses
if it would violate fundamental human rights. And to take a
six-month -- well, now a six-month old, then a two-month
old -- orphan female child in country this where there's no
reason if there's a plausible means which supported,
which the vice president's office supported, and which
itself said we will not oppose, you be lead to do that, and
then say -- the easy way out is has jurisdiction,
where that's not necessarily the case and where the record has
not been examined. We would say that's -- that's appropriate
to act in the best interest of the child.

We acted in the best interest of Haitian refugees, and we conducted a family tracing analysis, and we ultimately -- they received far more due process than she has. So there's the two aspects of Baby L and her due process rights. If terrorist detainees have the right to have a committee look at their case, then surely a baby has the right -- that right as well. But the courts properly exercised jurisdiction under UCCJEA.

THE COURT: Well, I will ask the government, is it your position that the Department of State has determined that the person seeking custody is the relative of this child?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, the State Department's

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position is that under international law it's for the government of to make that determination. And according to our understanding, the government of has gone through a vetting process, its own vetting process. It has -- it has identified this individual. It has actually identified the child as an _____, not at a stateless minor at all. And so in its understanding the child is relative is , and it is the government of position that the child needs to be returned to it for family reunification. I mean, here we're dealing with a child in , a non-US citizen in , and I don't believe that she has her own due process rights under United States law. It's a matter of international law and what is the United States' obligation under international law given that it's only because the United States happened to be their -- with the consent of the government of and came into custody of the child just for purposes of providing medical care. Now the government of has requested that she be reunited with her family. MR. MAST: Your Honor, so when we're dealing with who are about 40 percent or so of the population of -- the child was recovered in conference which has never been under government

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control. They have had multiple power sharing agreements with the and their leadership. You know, it's an open question as to the full -- the rights of statehood over these areas. But what we do know is that the strength of US intelligence was strong enough that We knew at that time that they were foreign fighters. This would be no different than if we covered an American child that's from American foreign fighters or a British child from them. would be no claim that has sovereignty over foreign fighters. THE COURT: Isn't this an individual citizen of the United States? Wouldn't it be an international situation? MR. MAST: Your Honor, it didn't have to be an international situation except that for the bad acts of State , and . We have word from one of Department, the attendees of that phone conference that there was never an analysis. There was laughing at the best interest of the child in this consideration. And General said I trust the uncle, and that was one of the -- flippantly dismissed it. The second claim was that the uncle -- well, the first two claims is an uncle had --

THE COURT: How do you perceive -- I mean, what --

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what are you asking for, ultimately? Your client is not asking to adopt the child. MR. MAST: No, sir. He wants to get her medical treatment in the United States because we dispute that this is a family member. We believe that this is were family, knows how to immediately go and get their children back from US custody. It happens all the time. have a doctor who is the in , who can testify to this. They routinely run children through there that fall temporarily into US custody. What they will do is use children as human shields. They get injured, they get picked up, they get patched up, and then knows how to immediately seek custody of them. She's been here 160 days, and that's because -- the only reasonable explanation these foreign fighters could know that with the going on right now, they are being officially -- their insistence is being officially denied. There are no in And so the only hope they have is confidentiality through ICRC approaching government -- approaching US through ICRC, which

they have, if that's true. And then ICRC coaching the

also in how to make the

request for her to be returned back. And that's, you know,

where -- where that's the case, the indications are strong

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And if

. We just want them -- the US to vet them for under ties and to ensure DNA connection. And by making those two simple requests, will self select themselves out and you will not hear from this supposed family ever again. And so in the meantime she can receive -- she had a . Her head is . She has that on her leg. is right here ready to treat her. And then any claims for actual relatives that are not can be addressed here in the United States. They just want to act in her best interest. They created a legal path to do that. It was acquiesced to by DoD. And State said they wouldn't interfere, and they have interfered a lot. And they put her Visa on hold. They told DoD withdraw that agency initiated Visa request. DoD initiated a parole Visa to get her treatment and State -- and and the others call over and said put it on hold. She could have been here now already if they had just consented to her getting medical treatment. It is absolutely outrageous that the United States government would knowingly close its eyes and say that non-existent screening protocols for under these circumstances ICRC -which has to be in confidentiality. We understand that. have to be agent for all players, but that is not proof that these are not

Strong evidence is that these are

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, despite claims you look at , we think that's not the case. We see child soldiers. We see child suicide bombers. Their specialty is training child . In all those pictures of little kids, four-year-olds with AKs, and learning how to make suicide vests and so forth. If we give her back to them and they are and we target them, she's going to die because US is going to kill whoever she's with. If she goes with them as an orphan, she's subject to risk of sexual trafficking and she's subject to risk because of her of being an ideal suicide bomber. THE COURT: How many children has your organization rescued? MR. MAST: From this is our first, but we've talked to some of the US lawyers who are in and they've rescued three. And so we can't save them all, and we're not claiming to, because we respect sovereignty. But here the circumstances were a clear path for the US to respect sovereignty and say, All our intel says that she's not . Are you okay with us getting her medical treatment in the US? Sure, no problem. , it's personal animus But ICRC and where when she found that the vice president's office said make every effort, said yes, sir, and they made every

effort. When she heard that, she said okay, fine, you do it.

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I won't interfere.

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When the issue arose of another unvetted claimant where we wanted to offer medical care and she found out, she went running over to the general in charge and says gag order and no one can advocate on their behalf, and they laughed about this. And it's outrageous.

THE COURT: For the government, you said several times international law requires that the Department of State turn this child back to ______. Can you cite to me chapter and verse what you're relying upon?

MS. WYER: I don't -- I don't have a cite that I can provide right now, but that's from the State Department's view of our international obligations. I mean, stemming from, for one thing, the fact that we are in at all by the consent of the government of _____, and it's really up to them what happens to a child found in their territory. All of these -- by the same token, what legal authority would allow the United States to impose these requirements on the government of since that's not the way it handles its vetting? It did its own vetting process. We can't dictate to the government of how it needs to go about vetting an individual as the relative of the child. And the UCCJEA recognizes that in the first instance by designating one jurisdiction as -- as the proper jurisdiction to make a determination, and here that would have been

MR. HAAS: Your Honor, this is Alexander Haas.

I would just like to add there is a between the United States and that was concluded in with the consent of their government and ours, and it reflects an expectation that our Armed Forces will conduct themselves in a manner consistent with law. In particular,

Now, this is a case that concerns the foreign affairs and military interests of the United States, and you had asked Counsel for the Plaintiff what specifically he was asking for. Initially he said that he wanted two weeks to brief this, but it is also clear that he apparently wants the Court to order the United States to take a citizen of another country and return that person to the United States for medical treatment. That would have potentially profound implications on our military and foreign affairs interests and is something that we would urge you not to do.

You also asked plaintiff how much notice that he had had, and I would remind the Court that he was aware two weeks ago of what he referred to as the writing on the wall and could have filed this motion then. We don't think given the shortness of time here that it is appropriate for the Court to enter an order enjoining the United States, particularly on the basis of a state court order to which we -- the United States was not provided formal notice under

counsel for the plaintiff said that DoD acquiesced in the order, but we were not given legal notice of that order as is required under law since we had physical and constructive custody of the child. That would have required the serving of legal process on the Department of Defense, among others, and we have searched and not found any evidence that formal notice was provided.

And the notion that a state court order obtained on the basis of what appears to be false or incomplete information would then be used to constrain the foreign policy and military affairs decisions of the United States is deeply concerning.

MR. MAST: Your Honor, the also says that may be moved into and out of the country. Duty personnel may be moved into and out of the country without a need to request permission from the government of And so --

(Interruption by the court reporter.)

THE COURT: Isn't this -- couldn't this be in or under immigration?

MR. MAST: No, because she is being brought -- and what's what the agency initiative of DoD created. DoD initiated parole Visa means that she could come for the limited purpose of getting medical treatment. So that's with the full knowledge and consent of DoD, that they initiated this parole Visa. It was only put on hold again through State's actions. They said they wouldn't oppose it. And if it was going to be such an international incident, why did fully support a pathway for her to get there to the United States for medical treatment? So we would say that this has been --

THE COURT: Would be no problem if the president of had agreed to this as recommended to state court that he would.

MR. MAST: Your Honor, that was -- and he never has said no. We just simply asked that they ask him, and State has continually said -- they have continually opposed to even ask him. And so they have helped create the situation. They shouldn't benefit from creating these facts.

THE COURT: But isn't that an answer when they demand the child back, that the government of demands the back? Why isn't that your answer?

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MR. MASTer: No, sir. I mean, like we've seen over , there have been British national children that have identified and removed. They know that they are not This child is not . She's from foreign leaders. And we have that we're aware of, and we believe that those -- those give the easy way out to say have they even tried. They didn't even try. THE COURT: If this child should come to the United States and have medical treatment, then the next step would be to ask for asylum in the United States. MR. MAST: It may happen, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, it would be sort of silly to bring the child here and send her back to MR. MAST: But a US court could apply law that respects international human rights. We have rights sex-based discrimination that -- and other factors that make it appropriate to apply US law here, especially when she was never in the physical custody of the government. There is strong evidence that she's foreign and not subject to their jurisdiction. And so if there is evidence of nonclaims who have not pulled an end run on family custodial issues on the which we think is the case with ICRC's help -- ICRC is not going to disclose whether they are -- and they are

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going to represent to who is relying upon ICRC they have found family, that's just a bear assertion. And so if those -- if she is brought to the United States and if claimants arise and they are vetted, two simple things: DNA test vetting and look at the US intel. Ask them to identify themselves, because if they are not --THE COURT: Is the Court to do that? MR. MAST: No, Your Honor, we want some status quo until the makes these -- makes this request. THE COURT: Is this Court to order them to do something? That would be their job anyway. MR. MAST: Whose job, Your Honor? MR. MAST: The party you're speaking of to do the vetting. MR. MAST: And that's what we're asking, do your job because --THE COURT: Okay. So they have done whatever and you don't like the result. MR. MAST: No, sir, they haven't done their job. They have not vetted for DNA. They can vet for DNA within four days. They have her DNA on file. They could vet for by saying we routinely require biometric screening of detainees and others in areas where there's no activity. If they are , they are not going to identify themselves, and all of our intel says that they are

foreign fighters and we sent 1 2 on the strength of that Now we can't say we don't know where the child is 3 4 from. THE COURT: Does the government have anything else? 5 MS. WYER: Your Honor, we cannot -- the Court just 6 7 can't require the United States to impose obligations on that are not in accord with 8 Ι mean, we --9 THE COURT: I gather he's asking this Court to 10 impose --11 12 MS. WYER: The plaintiffs are essentially --THE COURT: -- United States. 13 MS. WYER: Well, plaintiffs are essentially 14 demanding that the United States impose conditions on the 15 government of to return a child that the 16 17 government of is saying is their citizen and that they have identified this child's family member. They want to 18 19 reunify the child. This is putting the United States in a very difficult position. 20 THE COURT: Is there any law that requires the 21 22 United States to do the vetting that Mr. Mast is speaking of? MS. WYER: No, Your Honor. I'm not aware of any law 23 that would require that or even allow it. 24 MR. MAST: Your Honor, it took ten years of that 25

for US forces to find the moral clarity to stop
the practice of pedophilia on US installations with the bacha
bazi boys. And it took US personnel getting into fistfights
with men who were engaged in the rape of prepubescent boys on
US bases in order to finally come to that moral clarity that
we get to impose obligations which are consistent with
international human rights laws.

And in this situation it is inconsistent -- this isn't saying this is a farmer in that we would absolutely support reunification. What we're saying is this is training little to become suicide bombers, and they are pulling the wool over the eyes of our partners. And we need to mentor and assist, which is what we are continuing to do -- we've been there for 20 years, de facto control on . We need to assist our partners in vetting in this instance.

This is not a recipe for every child who comes into US custody, because this is unique.

You have a picture of her likely father, and we have had two false claimants already that couldn't be identified, or wouldn't be identified. One was who was in prison who was the facilitator who said I brought them here. He was not the uncle. Then we have another random claimant that when we say we want to offer you medical

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treatment, that person magically disappears. If the US, which State Department said they were willing to do, the Vice President's office said make every effort, they made him ask to the president of to provide a face saving means of providing care for this child. But that has created animosity with the and she has sabotaged this every step of the way. There was a DoD initiated parole Visa that is at USCIS that (phonetic) has put on hold at State's request. So if state would just get out of the way, we could have already done this, and there would not be an international incident. And why did DoD support this? But now it's allowing State to take the lead, and this is based on one woman's animus to being gone over her head because she was not respecting international human rights.

If you look at State's Twitter and all these other things, they talk about child trafficking, they talk about sexual exploitation, talk about rights for women. And when the rubber meets the road, they just want to wash their hands of a baby.

MR. HAAS: Your Honor, this is Alexander Haas again.

If I could just say one or two more things.

Plaintiffs' counsel says -- has gotten into a lot of, you know, twists and turns here, but sort of circling back to the legal principles. You asked were there things that the

plaintiffs could have done. Yes, we know of two now that have not occurred.

First, that they requested and did not obtain the consent of the government of to bring the child here, and plaintiffs' counsel conceded that that was required but has not been obtained.

Second, that they have submitted an application for parole of this child to the United States. And again, plaintiff has conceded that has not been granted.

There are procedures that have -- that they have attempted to take that have not -- not occurred. And so in the face of that, we don't think there is any legal basis for them to attempt to bring this child here, particularly when the government of a foreign country where our military is present by their consent has requested the repatriation of their citizen.

And to ask the Court in a matter of a few hours when they have had notice of this for months and had notice that something was up for several weeks to put a hold on a transfer and order the United States to not -- to halt is a very -- a very stark thing to ask this Court to do on such short notice, given that this involves core Article II powers of the executive branch to conduct our military and foreign affairs.

We're deeply concerned about what a message -- what such an order would be saying given the separation of powers.

And to do all of this on the basis of what we believe is a deeply flawed and incorrect state court order that could not bind the United States in any event would be -- would be in error, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does the government know or either party know of any citations, particularly in the Fourth Circuit, where a state court were not acting -- the federal court had a situation where the state court were not acting or were acting in excess of their jurisdiction? I assume there probably are situations.

MS. WYER: Well, there are certainly cases that make clear that a state court order cannot bind the United States in any event, even if it were a valid order.

THE COURT: Well, if the state court though made a decision that -- or gave the plaintiff in this case, allowed the plaintiff to adopt the child even though he's still in , you would have a -- I'm saying the state court did it would be probably in excess of its jurisdiction to do it. Maybe not, I don't know, but...

(Interruption by the court reporter.)

MR. MAST: Rooker-Feldman Doctrine addresses state court decisions, Your Honor.

MR. HAAS: Your Honor, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is an abstention doctrine that would require the Court to abstain.

There are several lines of cases, though, that

relate specifically to the -- of the power of state courts to try to bind the United States. And it's been clear since the civil war. There's, you know, the famous case that we all learned in law school, *Tarble's* case -- that's 80 U.S. 397 in 1871 -- that explained that state courts cannot issue, for example, writs of habeas corpus when someone is -- quote, Is in the custody under the authority of the United States.

And then there's the ordinary sovereign immunity principles that apply. And I direct you to a case called *Smith v. Cromer*. And I acknowledge it is in a different context, it's not a custody issue, but that's 159 F.3d 875, fourth Circuit from 1998. And it held that state court orders seeking to compel action by a federal official was, quote, An action against the United States subject to the governmental privilege of sovereign immunity. And that the -- so that would be another one.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Does the Department of Justice take the position that the orders of the courts were unlawful?

MS. WYER: Yes, Your Honor. We think they were unlawful for a number of reasons. One of them because the government of did not waive jurisdiction. And so under the Uniform Custody Law, should not have been exercising jurisdiction.

And I think if you look at the state law

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decision discusses the proper jurisdiction of a court to exercise jurisdiction over a custody proceeding. And under -under the home state definition, because did not qualify as the home state, should not have been exercising jurisdiction at all here. And also the fact that the court did not provide notice to DoD when DoD had custody of the child, I mean, if the United States had been involved in that proceeding as it should have been since it had custody, we imagine things would not have gone the same way because we would have been able to correct some of these factual errors that were happening there. So but anyway, in any case, a lack of notice is another basis that we think it is an erroneous decision and can't be binding on the United States. THE COURT: All right. Anything else anyone like to say? Okay. All right. I'm going to try to come to a decision by 5 o'clock. Are you-all going to be available then? MR. HAAS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right, because I think depending on what I do decide will be important for you to know. Okay. Why don't we adjourn now. And can we get

back on -- can we rearrange this call for 5 o'clock?

Everybody, if you-all dial in the same THE CLERK: 1 2 number at 5 o'clock we'll be on the line. MR. HAAS: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE REPORTER: Okay. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 (A recess was taken 4:25 p.m. to 5:08 p.m.) 6 7 THE CLERK: Do we have everybody on the line from the DOJ, US Attorney's Office? 8 MR. HAAS: This is Alexander Haas from the 9 Department of Justice. 10 MS. WYER: Kathryn Wyer from DOJ is here. 11 12 MR. BUBAR: Dan Bubar from the US Attorney's Office. MS. ROTTENBORN: Laura Rottenborn, USAO. 13 THE COURT: All right. This is Judge Moon. First I 14 want to thank counsel for your arguments today and for 15 appearing on very short notice. 16 This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs' 17 motion for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs are the 18 one seeking the emergency relief from the Court, and they have 19 to meet the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 20 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel applicable to 21 22 motions for preliminary injunctions and TROs. Plaintiffs must show, one, a likelihood of success 23 on the merits that plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable 24 harm absent the TRO, the balance of equity is tipped in 25

favor -- plaintiffs' favor, and that issuing the TRO is in the public interest.

I've considered plaintiffs' filings today and the argument of counsel. Plaintiffs filed this action and their request for a TRO and dozens of exhibits at 1 o'clock today. The Court heard argument in the case from 3:30 to 4:30. At 5 o'clock -- or at 5:06 or 7 now, I think -- the Court is rendering this oral decision.

Given the urgent time considerations plaintiffs have

Eastern Standard Time tonight, after consideration of the governing law, arguments, and submissions, I will deny plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. I do not find that plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits, and, also, I find that the balance of equities do not tip -- as I said, do not tip in favor of the plaintiff, or that the TRO is necessarily in the public interest.

Plaintiffs' asserted rights to care for Baby L arise from two court orders from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of and the Circuit Court.

But as the government has articulated, these court orders by their express terms reflect an assumption that the government of the will issue a waiver of jurisdiction. The order from the Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court states, quote: Evidence was 1 2 provided that through the after after consultation with the 3 has indicated that it will 4 issue a medical/responsibility/jurisdiction waiver to consent 5 to the US acting in the best interest of the child as a 6 7 refugee requesting asylum. The written copy of the waiver is to be provided in a matter of days. 8 has not issued any waiver of 9 jurisdiction. Instead, as Counsel for the government has 10 is expressly requesting that Baby asserted today, 11 L be returned under authority and care. 12 The government has also asserted that as custodian 13 of Baby L Department of Defense should have been formally 14 served with and provided notice of the proceedings in 15 County Circuit Court. That was not done. 16 orders were foundational to plaintiffs' 17 asserted authority to care for Baby L. Given the plain terms 18 of the court orders and the lack of service and 19 notice upon DoD, I find that plaintiffs have not met their 20 burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits. 21 Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits is 22 further diminished by their failure to proceed through proper 23 channels. As the government articulated, plaintiffs' counsel 24

had two alternative avenues to pursuing this 11th hour TRO.

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First, they should have obtained the consent of the government to the transfer of Baby L. While plaintiffs' counsel conceded both that it was required and they sought it, it ultimately was not obtained.

Second, plaintiffs' counsel also submitted an application for a Visa for this child to enter the US, which, again, plaintiff conceded was not granted.

Plaintiffs' failure to succeed under the two avenues demonstrate there's no legal basis to bring Baby L to the United States.

Lastly, I cannot overlook the international ramifications of the Court granting the request for temporary restraining order. The State Department has ably articulated the US government's foreign policy interest and has argued relations with ______ are significantly implicated by this case.

Plaintiffs' counsel suggested that if only the State
Department would, quote, get out of the way, end of quote,
everything would proceed in an orderly fashion and
would respect human rights law. But it is the role of the
State Department and not private litigants or the Court to
determine the foreign policy interest of the United States.

For these reasons, I deny plaintiffs' motion for a TRO.

And that's the decision. And anything else?

MR. HAAS: Nothing from United States, Your Honor. 1 2 Thank you very much. (Interruption by court reporter.) 3 MR. MAST: Clarification is that it was a DoD 4 initiated parole Visa. We did not initiate the Visa. 5 THE COURT: Okay. With that correction then, we'll 6 7 adjourn. Thank you all. COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 (The proceedings concluded at 5:15 p.m.) **CERTIFICATE** 10 I, Mary J. Butenschoen, certify that the foregoing 11 is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the 12 above-entitled matter. 13 /S/ Mary J. Butenschoen, RPR, CRR 3/14/2020 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25